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Years before the ENRON debacle, the Supreme Court heard a pair of cases
involving dishonest financial accounting, Frank Lyon Co. v. U.S.1 and Cottage Savings
Ass’n. v. Commissioner.2 Both cases raised fundamental tax law issues concerning who
really owns property and when losses are deductible. The cases also shared a peculiar
genesis. In both cases, federal bank regulators had encouraged deceptive financial
accounting in order to circumvent statutes intended to protect bank depositors, and the
deceptive accounting became the basis for taxpayer claims.
The Supreme Court, however, did not comment in either opinion on the deceptive
character of the financial accounting that gave rise to tax litigation. In one sense, this
omission is understandable. The Internal Revenue Service had no standing to challenge
the decisions by the bank regulators to countenance deceptive accounting. Thus, the
propriety of the accounting was not a legal issue in either case. Nevertheless, it is
astonishing that the Court did not mention, even in passing, that the tax issues arose only
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435 U.S. 561 (1978).
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499 U.S. 554 (1991).
1

because bank regulators, charged with promoting fair and accurate accounting disclosure,
violated their public trust.
The first case, Frank Lyon, involved a transaction between the taxpayer and
Worthen Bank, located in Little Rock, Arkansas. Worthen had spent $10 million on a
new headquarters building. The bank was subject to regulation by the Federal Reserve
System and needed Federal Reserve approval of its spending for the new building. The
Federal Reserve ruled that the $10 million cost exceeded statutory limits on the amount
that a bank could spend on its premises and therefore refused to permit Worthen to
continue to own the building.
The Federal Reserve did, however, approve an arrangement, different in form but
not in substance, under which Worthen could use the building without actually owning it.
First, Worthen sold the building to Frank Lyon Co. for $7,640,000, which was
$2,360,000 less than the building’s actual cost. Frank Lyon financed the $7,640,000
price with a $500,000 cash payment plus a 25-year mortgage loan from New York Life
Insurance Co. for the $7,140,000 balance.
Second, Frank Lyon leased the building back to Worthen for 25 years. The lease
was a full payout lease that would fund repayment of the mortgage; each year for 25
years, the rent owed by Worthen to Frank Lyon equaled the mortgage payment owed by
Frank Lyon to New York Life. The lease was also a net lease; the lessee, Worthen, was
responsible for all expenses of the building, including utilities, maintenance, insurance,
property taxes, and so on.
Third, Frank Lyon granted Worthen an option to repurchase the building during
the 11th through 25th years of the lease. To exercise the repurchase option, Worthen had
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to pay Frank Lyon an amount equal to the $500,000 cash down payment plus 6% interest
on that down payment compounded to the date of the option’s exercise and, in addition,
had to assume the unpaid balance of Frank Lyon’s mortgage obligation.
Worthen was virtually certain to exercise the option because it was “in the
money,” that is, the exercise price was almost certain to be substantially less than the
building’s market value. For example, at the end of the 25th year, when the mortgage was
fully paid off, the exercise price was $500,000 plus interest at six percent compounded
for 25 years, or $2,150,000 total. The building, which cost $10 million, would have to
lose nearly eighty percent of its value before exercise of the repurchase option would no
longer make sense.
That Worthen expected to exercise the option is also indicated by the sales price
to Frank Lyon, which was only $7,640,000, an amount $2,360,000 less than the
building’s $10 million cost. Worthen was presumably willing to sell the building below
cost only because it planned to recoup the $2,360,000 difference by exercising the option
to repurchase the building in the future.3
At this point in the narrative, it should be apparent that the economic relationships
among Worthen, the mortgagee (N.Y. Life), and Frank Lyon were virtually identical to
the relationships between an owner, a first mortgagee, and a second mortgagee,
respectively. Worthen’s investment in the leasehold and repurchase option was no
different from that of an owner who finances the $10 million cost of a building with a
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As an alternative to exercising the repurchase option, Worthen could renew the lease
for up to five additional eight-year terms. Tthe rents specified for the eight renewal
periods would also have provided Frank Lyon with the equivalent of $500,000
compounded at six percent.
3

$2,360,000 cash down payment, a $7,140,000 first mortgage, and a $500,000 second
mortgage. Worthen could obtain full ownership of the building free and clear of the
claims of others by repaying the amounts, plus interest, advanced by the other two parties
to the transaction. Whether Worthen formally owned the building, as it originally
desired, or was a lessee with a repurchase option, as the Federal Reserve permitted, had
no real impact whatsoever on the amount that Worthen actually spent on the building.
The reader may therefore wonder what the Federal Reserve was thinking when it
prevented Worthen from owning the building, on the grounds that ownership would
violate statutory limits on what a bank may spend on its premises, but approved
equivalent spending through a lease with an option to repurchase. 4 It seems
inconceivable that the Federal Reserve did not understand the financial equivalence.
The Federal Reserve apparently wanted to permit Worthen to evade the statutory
limits on the amount a bank can spend on its own premises. In order to achieve this
objective, however, the banking regulator condoned deceptive accounting. In calculating
how much the bank spent on its premises, the Federal Reserve counted only the cost of
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Two decades later, in a virtually identical transaction involving a building, the
Comptroller of the Currency decided that it was really the lessee with the option to
repurchase who had invested in real property. In this transaction, a nonbanking business
was the long-term lessee of real estate and held an option to repurchase at a bargain price,
while the lessor (and nominal owner) was a bank. The issue was whether the bank had
invested in real estate in violation of federal statutory limits. The Comptroller held that
the bank did not really own the real estate but had simply provided financing. Therefore,
the arrangement did not violate statutory limits on how much a bank could spend on real
estate. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 806 (October 17, 1997).
4

real property to which the bank held legal title and excluded the cost of the leasehold
interest and repurchase option.5
How did this accounting subterfuge produce litigation over taxes? Since the
Federal Reserve considered Frank Lyon rather than Worthen to be the building’s owner,
Frank Lyon presumed that it could claim depreciation deductions for the building on its
tax return. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) challenged this claim on the ground that
Frank Lyon was not the real owner for tax purposes.
To the IRS, it must have seemed an easy case, with the legal precedents clearly
supporting its position. In similar circumstances in 1939, the Supreme Court had held
that the lessee with an option to repurchase at a bargain price was the owner for tax
purposes.6 The federal courts had applied this rule consistently for decades to distinguish
between a financing party who holds formal legal title and the real owner for tax
purposes.7 While the Federal Reserve might treat Worthen as not owning the building for
purposes of enforcing federal limits on a bank’s investment in its premises, for purposes
of the tax law, the building’s real owner was Worthen.
True, Frank Lyon initially prevailed before a friendly judge in the taxpayer’s local
Federal District Court in Little Rock, Arkansas.8 The trial court, however, based its
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Generally Accepted Accounting Principles require a lessee to treat a so-called “capital
lease” as constituting ownership of the leased property. A lease is considered a capital
lease if the lessee has an option, as Worthen did, to purchase the leased property at a
bargain price. See DAVID R. HERWITZ & MATTHEW J. BARRETT, ACCOUNTING
FOR LAWYERS, 843-45 (2001)
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Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939).
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See Estate of Starr v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1959).
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36 AFTR2d 75-5254 (E.D. Ark. 1975).
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decision for the taxpayer on an a patently false finding: that the exercise price provided in
the option to repurchase reflected, not a bargain price, but the parties’ best estimate of the
full fair market value of the building at the future time when the option would be
exercised.9 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit predictably reversed.10
Tax lawyers were therefore surprised when the Supreme Court decided that Frank
Lyon was the real owner for tax purposes and could take depreciation deductions for the
building.11 What might explain this unprecedented result? The Court emphasized
Federal Reserve approval of the transaction that designated Frank Lyon as the building’s
owner.12 You might think of the Court’s decision as exemplifying the principle of cross-

9
10

435 U.S. 561, 572, n. 6.
536 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1976).
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See Bernard Wolfman, The Supreme Court in The Lyon’s Den: A Failure of Judicial
Process, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1075 1087-88 (1981). The taxpayer in Frank Lyon
made an inspired choice of counsel to prosecute the appeal of the unfavorable outcome in
the Circuit Court. The taxpayer selected a former “Tenth Justice”, Erwin Griswold, who
had served as Solicitor General from 1967 to 1973 and, as a consequence of his former
position, may have unduly influenced the outcome.
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The Court offered two other justifications for concluding that Frank Lyon was the
owner for tax purposess and for distinguishing its earlier precedent, Helvering v. Lazarus,
308 U.S. 252 (1939), in which it held that a lessor in similar circumstances was not the
real owner. First, the Lyon Court ruled that Frank Lyon had incurred significant risks
because it was liable for the entire $7,140,000 mortgage in the event that Worthen
defaulted on the rent. However, Frank Lyon’s potential liability was simply a financing
risk, indistinguishable from the financing risk incurred by the lessor in Lazarus. Second,
the Court stated that the case involved a three-party transaction, in which a third party
mortgagee provided financing for the sale of the building from the Worthen to Frank
Lyon, whereas the Lazarus transaction, which was seller-financed, had only two parties,
the seller and the buyer. However, the court never explained why third-party financing
should make a difference. If anything, the existence of a third party meant that the lessor
in Frank Lyon incurred even less risk than the lessor in Lazarus and therefore should
have been even less likely to be considered the tax owner of the building. Third-party
financing is logically relevant only if there is a chance that the price paid for depreciable
6

town estoppel: a federal agency in one part of the town of Washington, D.C., namely the
IRS, is estopped from challenging a transaction endorsed by a different federal agency in
another part of town, the Federal Reserve.13
The Court may also have been reluctant to create an unfair windfall for Worthen
at Frank Lyon’s expense. Depreciation deductions are a valuable tax benefit. If Frank
Lyon was not the real owner for tax purposes and could not deduct the depreciation, then
Worthen was the real owner who could. Yet the terms of the repurchase option –
providing a six percent cash return on the $500,000 in financing provided by Frank Lyon
– were negotiated with the expectation that Frank Lyon would obtain tax benefits by
depreciating the building.14 A Supreme Court decision for the IRS therefore would
therefore have upset the bargain reached by the parties with the Federal Reserve’s
approval.15

property is being inflated, a circumstance that did not arise in either Lazarus or Frank
Lyon.
13

This estoppel principle supposedly protects citizens from being whipsawed between
two different federal bureaucracies with different points of view.
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Thus, the return on the $500,000 that Frank Lyon contributed to the transaction was to
consist of two components: cash payments from Worthen equal to 6 percent interest plus
depreciation deductions for the building. If Frank Lyon had thought that the depreciation
was Worthen’s, then presumably the repurchase option would have provided for larger
cash payments from Worthen in order to provide an adequate return on the $500,000 in
cash that Frank Lyon advanced.

15

The Court apparently never considered the possibility that Frank Lyon did not deserve
sympathy or protection because Frank Lyon could and should have taken steps to protect
its position. Frank Lyon could, for example, have consulted tax counsel before assuming
that it would be able to depreciate the building rather than simply relying on the fact that
the Federal Reserve had approved the deal. Counsel would have advised that Frank
Lyon’s claim of depreciation deductions for the building would almost certainly be
challenged. Frank Lyon then could have insisted that the repurchase option provide for
Worthen to indemnify Frank Lyon, by making an additional cash payment, in the event
7

The accounting deception was even more egregious in the second Supreme Court
case, Cottage Savings. During the 1970s, the assets of Savings and Loan Associations
(S&Ls) consisted largely of long-term, fixed interest rate home mortgages. These assets
plummeted in value when market interest rates rose dramatically during this period. As a
result, the S&L industry was in crisis, with thousands of institutions on the verge of
bankruptcy, threatening the savings of millions of depositors.
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) was the government agency
responsible for supervising S&Ls. On the advice of the FHLBB, Cottage Savings
swapped its existing home mortgages for different mortgages with the same risk and
expected return characteristics. The FHLBB encouraged thousands of other S&Ls in the
same position as Cottage Savings to engage in similar mortgage swaps in order to realize
the losses and claim a deduction for tax purposes. The FHLBB also ruled that losses
from mortgage swaps – which it believed would be deductible for federal tax purposes –
would not have to be reported for purposes of financial accounting because they effected
no real change in the economic position of the S&Ls.
The FHLBB’s objective in promoting the mortgage swaps was to enable S&Ls to
deduct tax losses without recording the losses on their balance sheets. The FHLBB
understood that financial accounting disclosure of the losses would have revealed that
many S&Ls were actually insolvent, and federal statutes would then have required the
FHLBB to shut down the insolvent S&Ls. Thus, the FHLBB, like the Federal Reserve in
Frank Lyon, was circumventing statutory rules intended to protect the public.

that Frank Lyon was denied depreciation deductions for the building and Worthen
consequently received the depreciation’s tax benefits.
8

The FHLBB’s nondisclosure rule, moreover, was contrary to Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP), which require a loss on property to be reported no later
than the time when the loss is realized through a sale or exchange. When unrealized
losses are unusually large, as in the case of S&Ls in the late 1970s, these principles
advise (but do not require) that the losses be disclosed in order to convey an accurate
picture of the subject’s financial position, even though the losses have not yet been
realized through a sale or exchange.
Given the public’s stake in knowing if a bank faces insolvency, the large losses of
the S&Ls, whether realized or not, should have been disclosed for financial accounting
purposes. The FHLBB’s failure to require reporting of such unrealized losses was bad
enough. To authorize the nondisclosure of those losses, even when realized through a
mortgage swap, was blatantly dishonest and helped conceal the festering savings and loan
crisis.
If the S&Ls had reported the losses for both financial reporting and tax purposes,
the IRS would probably not have complained. It was the inconsistent treatment that
seems to have caused the IRS to challenge the deductions for losses realized when
existing mortgages were swapped for different mortgages with the same risk and
expected return.
This time the legal precedents did not favor the IRS. The tax law generally treats
losses as deductible when realized through a sale or exchange even if the taxpayer
acquires other property with the same economic characteristics.16 A deduction is
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generally disallowed only if the taxpayer replaces the property sold or exchanged with
virtually identical property.17 It was therefore unsurprising that the Supreme Court ruled
for the taxpayer in Cottage Savings and held that the losses were deductible for tax
purposes even if not disclosed for purposes of financial accounting. The Court, however,
once again failed to mention the deceptive character of the financial accounting that gave
rise to the tax litigation.
The S&L crisis had more than enough villains: bank executives who made
imprudent loans; federal regulators who encouraged deceptive accounting; and elected
officials who refused to act until a federal bailout of the S&L sector, costing hundreds of
billions of dollars, became necessary. Compared to these miscreants, the Supreme Court
in deciding Cottage Savings was just a bystander. Yet even a bystander has a civic (if not
a legal) duty to report illegal behavior when he or she observes it. So perhaps the Court
should have mentioned the FHLBB’s dishonesty and dereliction in its opinion in Cottage
Savings, even if the mention would have been mere dictum, especially since the purpose
of the deception was to evade statutory requirements intended to protect the public.
We can even imagine what might have happened if the Court had criticized the
Federal Reserve for condoning deceptive accounting in its earlier opinion in Frank Lyon.
The FHLBB might have been less eager a few years later to encourage deceptive
accounting that covered up the S&L crisis. Even ENRON’s managers and accountants,
two decades later, might not have made such egregiously false financial claims.
16

See Smith v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 350 (1982), affirmed, 1820 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir.
1988). The exception in § 1031, providing for nonrecognition of losses on exchanges of
properties of like kind, does not apply to mortgages.
17

See I.R.C. § 1091(a); Horne v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 250 (1945); McWilliams v.
Commissioner, 331 U.S. 694 (1947); Smith, supra note 15.
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